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Trade and war
The topic of this volume is the relation between war and trade in the eighteenth 
and early nineteenth century: more specifically, the political, legal and intellectual 
trajectories through which Grotius’s statement that neutrals should “sit still” while 
belligerents fight wars in the name of justice developed into a full-blown legal-
political debate about the rights of neutral trade.1 From the early eighteenth to 
the early nineteenth century, this debate not only generated rival outlooks on 
the generally perceived global challenge to somehow define the rights of states 
at war vis-à-vis neutrals – typically smaller states – and vice versa, but in its 
turn was understood as a possible key to the reform of the interstate system.2
It was a great commonplace in the eighteenth century that trade between 
individuals as well as states raised culture, arts and living standards, satisfied 
needs and desires, created ties between people through divisions of labour and 
softened manners. In sum, the growth of trade as a natural effect of production 
innovation, specialisation and comparative advantages amounted to a divine 
providential plan to perfect human nature and its political organisations. History 
showed that small free states like Venice and the Dutch Republic, miserably 
situated in infertile marshes and lagoons, could create wealth by transporting and 
1 Hugo Grotius, The Rights of War and Peace, ed. Richard Tuck (Indianapolis: Liberty Fund, 
2005), vol. 3, p. 1525. See the article by Tara Helfman in this volume.
2 The notion of neutral trade rights, generally forms of “active” neutrality – see below, as having 
an effects on interstate relations distinguishes the eighteenth-century debate about neutrality from 
the general notion of neutrality as abstention from war. The idea of neutrality itself, of course, was 
no eighteenth-century invention, see Robert A. Bauslaugh, The concept of neutrality in classical 
Greece (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1991). A recent publication on cases mainly within 
the sixteenth and seventeenth century seems to come from a different world: Jean-François Chanet 
and Christian Windler, Les ressources des faibles, Neutralités, sauvegardes, accommodements en 
temps de guerre (xvie–xviiie siècles) (Rennes: Presses Universitaires de Rennes, 2009).
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exchanging goods produced by more fortunate territorial monarchies. Interstate 
commercial relationships arose in consequence.
However, it was also widely understood that trade had become heavily politicised. 
Between the late seventeenth and mid-eighteenth century aspiring hegemonic 
monarchies turned to trade as a source of political power and reformed themselves 
into commercial Empires that were locked into a competition that culminated, in 
1756, in the Seven Years’ War, the first in a series of global wars until 1815.3
Trade could equally be an agent of peace and prosperity as an instrument of war, 
and in the reality of eighteenth-century Europe the latter manifestation prevailed. 
When David Hume noted that in contrast to the epoch of Renaissance Reason 
of State thinking, in the modern world trade had become “an affair of state”, and 
that states looked “on the progress of their neighbours with a suspicious eye”, he 
pointed to an underlying crisis that was military, economic and social at the same 
time.4 That crisis was addressed across Europe in a great number of local political 
and highly diverse intellectual debates.
One of the great consequences of the politicisation of foreign trade, and of the 
reciprocal logic of commerce at large, was that small states were no longer masters 
of their own destiny. In refusing to give up their precarious liberty they had, as 
Adam Ferguson wrote, become “neither masters nor slaves”.5 Precisely because 
their predicament mirrored the general crisis of European politics, statesmen, 
pamphleteers and political writers across Europe analysed the future prospects of 
smaller states (“Dutch decline” in that way became a hotly debated topic6). Devising 
strategies for the economic development of any state simultaneously required forming 
ideas about the possible dissolution of what was known as “Jealousy of Trade”.
What were the options for neutralising “Jealousy of Trade” and how had it 
appeared? The issue called for a reconsideration of the historical, legal and 
moral philosophical foundations of modern commercial society, from which new 
political theories arose: the core of both Montesquieu’s Esprit des lois – nowadays 
considered the beginning of modern constitutionalism – and Adam Smith’s Wealth 
of nations – known now as the start of modern economics – was the analysis 
of the genesis of modern government from feudal social-economic history and 
law. Increasingly, Enlightenment political thinkers agreed that the collapse of the 
3 Next to specialised studies on Anglo-French commercial competition, the concepts behind 
this rivalry are reconstructed in Istvan Hont, Jealousy of Trade: International Competition and 
the Nation-State in Historical Perspective (Cambridge Ma.: Harvard University Press, 2005) and 
Michael Sonenscher, Before the Deluge: Public Debt, Inequality, and the Intellectual Origins of the 
French Revolution (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2007).
4 David Hume “Of Civil Liberty”, Political Essays, ed. Knud Haakonssen (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1989), pp. 51–7. See Hont, Jealousy of Trade, pp. 1–17.
5 Richard Whatmore, “‘Neither masters nor slaves’. Small states and Empire in the Long Eighteenth 
Century’”, Proceedings of the British Academy, “Lineages of Empire. The Historical Roots of British 
Imperial Thought”, ed. D. Kelly (2009), pp. 53–81 and (to be read in conjunction with) Richard 
Whatmore, “Vattel, Britain and Peace in Europe”, Grotiana 31 (2010), pp. 1–23.
6 See the contributions to the special issue of History of European Ideas on “Dutch Decline in 
Eighteenth-Century Europe” (volume 36/2, 2010, ed. Koen Stapelbroek).
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Roman Empire, the rise of Christianity, feudalism and the destruction of Europe’s 
agriculture by “barbaric” tribes eventually put early-modern states on a path that 
inspired the use of trade for hegemonic purposes and embark on self-deceptive 
economic strategies that triggered inequality, lack of circulation, high wages, 
inflation and food shortages.7
To establish the separation of trade and war a major strand of writers envisaged 
great territorial reforms, supra-state regimes of coercive arbitration or the creation 
of a Universal Monarchy as the only route back to the path of natural progress 
of humankind. Others argued that the existing Balance of Power and the rise of 
commerce had grown up together and that the only viable kind of regulation of 
interstate trade relations would derive from states voluntarily realising a commercial 
and constitutional self-reform, which would have salutary effects in the international 
realm, where these reforms would be mirrored in the codified form of treaties.8
Interestingly, in these discussions a range of economic solutions (single currencies, 
devaluations, foreign debt investments by states and individuals) were suggested to 
have political balancing potential. Likewise, the establishment of agricultural patriotic 
academies and debates about single taxes, free ports and trade companies took 
place inspired by rival visions of a future reformed international order. By means of 
investing in particular fiscal, trade or social reforms, nation-states reconceptualised 
their sovereignty and identity as based on a choice between competitive emulation 
among open cosmopolitan societies or peaceful co-existence among closed 
commercial societies. To closely understand eighteenth-century arguments about 
neutrality the topic must be brought within the same frame.
The eighteenth-century history of neutrality
The problem of neutral trade was a direct manifestation of the underlying crisis in 
eighteenth-century interstate politics. Between the outbreak of the Seven Years’ 
War (1756) and the end of the Napoleonic Wars (1815), the right of neutral states 
to engage in trade with each other and with belligerents was among the most 
7 For different narratives of Enlightened history, see J.G.A. Pocock, Barbarism and Religion: 
Narratives of Civil Government (Cambridge,: Cambridge University Press, 1999). See my article on 
Ferdinando Galiani’s Dei doveri for a typical example of a thinker whose entire oeuvre was derived 
from his historical understanding of the progress of human kind since the fall of Rome.
8 See the article by Isaac Nakhimovsky in this volume as well as his The Closed Commercial 
State: Perpetual Peace and Commercial Society from Rousseau to Fichte (forthcoming in 2011 with 
Princeton University Press). See also Michael Sonenscher, Sans-culottes: an eighteenth-century 
emblem in the French Revolution (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2008), and Istvan Hont, 
“The early Enlightenment debate on commerce and luxury”, The Cambridge History of Eighteenth-
Century Political Thought, eds. Mark Goldie and Robert Wokler (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2006), pp. 379–418. Remarkably perhaps in the light of this opposition is Isaac de Pinto’s 
support of the second view (against reconstitution of the European state system), which led to the 
conclusion that a European union was required to preserve that continent’s economic flourishing, 
see my article below on Dutch neutrality.
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hotly debated political issues across and beyond Europe.9 Rather than a problem 
pertaining straightforwardly to the discipline of international law (where it has been 
studied most), the issue presented a challenge to political writers of the time to 
reconsider the historical, legal and moral philosophical foundations of modern 
commercial society and the ways in which state sovereignty could be reconciled 
with universal economic development.
Although now largely forgotten, the eighteenth-century debate about neutral 
trade lay at the centre of the main political challenge of the Enlightenment to 
realign international trade and military competition and had many contributors, 
notably some of the more famous writers of the time. The central texts of the 
core debate itself form a neatly circumscribed body of texts that by the second 
half of the eighteenth century constituted its own canon: from Bynkershoek via 
Wolff, Vattel, Hübner and Justi to Galiani, Lampredi, Azuni, Martens, von Gentz, 
Hauterive, Schlegel and Ward (to give something of an [incomplete] chronology). 
The contributors to this volume trace the transformation of ideas about neutrality 
and trade from the remarks by Hugo Grotius in De Jure Belli ac Pacis, book III, 
chapter 17, that “neutrals should sit still”, to the redefinition of the idea of trade by 
Cornelis van Bynkershoek – whose ideas were adopted by the British Admiralty in 
the course of the Seven Years’ War. Similar views, in many respects, particularly 
with regards to the British take on neutral rights, were incorporated in Emer de 
Vattel’s outlook on the commercial side of the Balance of Power, which was inspired 
by the events of the War of the Austrian Succession (notably the Dutch quandary 
about its rights and duties towards Britain10). Vattel’s basic foundation for dealing 
with interstate conflict and neutrality was sharply criticised by the Dane Martin 
Hübner, who explicitly identified his own proto-internationalist proposals for the 
resolution of neutral trade conflicts with the aim to restore the “natural condition of 
peace and good understanding” between states.11
A particularly puzzling episode within the history of neutral rights, and that has 
been conspicuously overlooked by historians of political thought, remains the First 
League of Armed Neutrality. In 1780, at the height of the war of the American 
Independence, the Russian Empress Catherine II declared five principles of Armed 
Neutrality and launched the formation of a league of neutral states. Between 
1780 and 1783 all principal European powers, apart from England, announced 
their adhesion to the League. Although given in by Russia’s interest as a rising 
commercial power to access the Baltic and the Mediterranean and often suspected 
to be an anti-British ploy or an attempt by Catherine to manipulate the existing 
9 See Richard Pares, Colonial Blockade and Neutral Rights (1739–1763) (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1938), who rightfully charts the entire debate back to the War of the Austrian 
Succession.
10 The cover image of this volume stems from this period.
11 Martin Hübner, De la saisie des batimens neutres, ou Du Droit qu’ont les Nations Belligérantes 
d’arrêter les Navires des Peuples Amis Dedica a son excellence Monseigneur le baron de Bernstorff 
(2 vols. The Hague, 1759).
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Balance of Power, the League of Armed neutrality was also regarded across Europe 
as an alternative peace plan.12
To justify Catherine’s League of Armed Neutrality as saving the world from the 
violent remnants of Roman warlike passions in eighteenth-century international 
relations, the Neapolitan Ferdinando Galiani, in 1782, provided a highly ambitious 
reconstruction of the shadowy origins both of modern natural law discourse and 
of international law. What defined the League of Armed Neutrality, from this 
perspective, was its spectacular attempt to realign trade and war by universalising 
the commercial treaty system and civilising naval warfare.13
The uncoupling of trade and war by Catherine was used by founding father 
Alexander Hamilton in the process of American state building,14 while European 
upheavals following the French Revolution saw the republications of pamphlets from 
earlier wars and triggered a major debate between French and British ideologues of 
inter-state order.15 Parallel to these events, in the wake of the Napoleonic wars legal 
disputes between France and Britain over reprisals and third parties accompanied 
the high political debate over the future of international trade and politics.16 
Forms of neutrality
Amidst international disputes about depredations of neutral ships, writers like 
Vattel and Hübner did not restrict their perspective on neutrality to the task of fixing 
the boundary between rightfully neutral trade and contraband. Although directly 
concerned with the containment of existing conflict, these thinkers considered the 
12 Isabel de Madariaga, Britain, Russia and the Armed Neutrality of 1780. (London: Hollis and 
Carter, 1962), pp. 439–58. Catherine’s League of Armed Neutrality and its revival by Paul I in 1800 
are now generally regarded as unsuccessful because they failed to protect the neutrality of its 
members. It remains an interesting challenge to reconstruct the various ways in which the Armed 
neutrality was perceived at the time.
13 See my article on Galiani, who was tremendously critical of Vattel in particular. Yet, for all his 
insistence on his natural law principle of beneficence and his views on universal sociability his 
political views and ideas on the institutional accommodation of international relations were still much 
closer to those of Bynkershoek and Vattel than to their opponents’. In the part of Martens’s Précis 
dedicated to neutrality the most cited text was Galiani’s Dei doveri.
14 See the article by Mark Somos in this volume. Hamilton’s ideas on the functioning of the American 
Constitution came into play in an exchange between James Stephen, War in disguise, or, The frauds 
of the neutral flags (London, 1805), Gouverneur Morris, An answer to War in disguise, or, Remarks 
upon the new doctrine of England, concerning neutral trade (New York, 1806), Gouverneur Morris, 
An answer to War in disguise, or, Remarks upon the new doctrine of England, concerning neutral 
trade (New York, 1806) and James Madison, Examination of the British doctrine, which subjects to 
capture a neutral trade, open in time of peace (s.l., 1806), Anonymous, Belligerent rights asserted 
and vindicated against neutral encroachments: being an answer to An examination of the British 
doctrine which subjects to capture a neutral trade not open in time of peace (London, 1806) and 
Anonymous, War without disguise; or, The frauds of neutral commerce; a justification of belligerent 
captures; with on the Answer to War in disguise, and Mr. Madison’s examination (s.l., 1807). See 
Stephen Neff, “James Stephen’s War in Disguise: The Story of a Book”, Irish Jurist 38, pp. 331–51.
15 See the article by Isaac Nakhimovsky.
16 See the article by Stephen Neff in this volume. For comparison see G.F.A. Best, “Britain and 
Blockade, 1780–1940”, Britain and the Netherlands, volume VI, War and Society, eds. A.C. Duke 
and C.A. Tamse (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1977). pp. 141–67.
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problem of neutrality in relation to the ultimate causes of war. They devised their 
theories of natural law to correspond to a long-term political and economic civilising 
process of the existing international order, in which tensions between trade and the 
Balance of Power were ironed out.17
Precisely the relation between the rights of neutrals and belligerents and the 
Balance of Power always separated rival parties in the debate. This was so from 
the first half of the eighteenth century onwards, since the War of the Austrian 
Succession. During the 1740s the issue developed whether neutral trade in wartime 
should itself serve as a corrective to the Balance of Power. On a political and 
diplomatic level, French writers typically urged the Dutch (the main neutral shipping 
nation) to stand by their rights included in treaties with England. In that way the 
Dutch could set straight the historical record of English attempts in their quest 
for global supremacy to defraud the Dutch of their interest. On their part, British 
writers, political officials and judges referred to Bynkershoek and, realising that the 
exploitation of neutral trade did not contain but prolong and extend war, devised 
alternative outlooks on the regulation of neutral trade. These outlooks were not 
primarily treaty based, but derived from a natural law theory of trade. These British 
regulations, notably the doctrines put into effect during the Seven Years’ War, 
justified interference with forms of neutral trade that cynically profited from war. 
The cover image of this volume, a British publication from the time of the War of 
the Austrian Succession depicts a Dutch farmer milking the ongoing struggle for 
hegemony while rival territorial powers attempt to lead on the cow (“Power”).18 
From this point onwards the idea took hold that Great Britain manipulated the 
rights of neutral trade for the sake of political aggrandisement and the protection 
of its maritime commercial empire. Simultaneously, the notions emerged that 
Dutch merchants were interested in a form of abusive neutrality and tempted by 
French promises to renew an advantageous commercial treaty, while the French 
themselves hoped that with the aid of neutral trade an overhaul of the Balance 
of Power could be effected. In the opinions of many writers and pamphleteers 
such an overhaul brought within reach a more fundamental reform of international 
relations and might restore the natural condition of nations being equal members 
17 On the longer history of natural law thought on war and peace see Richard Tuck, The Rights of 
War and Peace: Political Thought and the International Order from Grotius to Kant (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1999). On the relation between political economy and the law of nations see 
the preface of Emer de Vattel, The Law of Nations, eds. Bela Kapossy and Richard Whatmore 
(Indianapolis; Liberty Fund, 2008). On Hubner, Vattel and Galiani, see Koen Stapelbroek, “Universal 
Society, Commerce and the Rights of Neutral Trade: Martin Hübner, Emer de Vattel and Ferdinando 
Galiani”, COLLeGIUM: Studies Across Disciplines in the Humanities and Social Sciences 3 (2008), 
pp. 63–89.
18 The cover image is reproduced courtesy of the American Antiquarian Society. Entitled “The 
Benefit of Neutrality” the engraving was published 26 December 1745 according to Act of Parliament 
by C. Goodwin.
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in a universal society of humankind, rather than aggressive rivals for wealth and 
power.19
Problems within the British approach to regulating neutrality generally could 
be associated with the fluidity of the contemporary notion of “active neutrality” 
(as opposed to the concept of “passive”, or “perfect” neutrality: the complete 
abstention from immersion in conflict, including through commercial exchange, in 
order to help a quick resolution20). If it was permitted to continue trade in wartime 
according to certain precepts about the proper nature of trade, those precepts 
tended not to be specific enough to fix the boundary between proper trade and 
what ought to be contraband? This was a major complaint of Robert Plumer Ward 
about Bynkershoek’s take on neutrality and presumably a reason why writers like 
him and Georg Friedrich von Martens analysed the existing system of European 
treaties to explore the possibilities of that the existing interstate order itself could be 
the platform for the further perfection of the practice of neutral trade.21 
Interestingly, a number of Dutch authors bought into the British lines of argument 
and argued that these views compared with the French line of argument provided 
much brighter prospects for the future of Dutch economic development.22 The British 
outlook on neutrality, they argued, derived from an idea of international politics that 
had an inherent lawfulness to it and would in the long run do justice to the “intrinsic 
power” of the Dutch state and its trade-based capacity for economic development. 
Britain had not behaved like a commercial empire imposing its law onto the world, 
as radical Dutch patriots and Batavians cried out. Instead, in matters of neutral 
trade Britain’s moderation towards the Dutch had been clear.23
Another attempt to discipline the problem of neutral trade was put forward by 
the French thinker Forbonnais, whose project for a regulated competition among 
neutral states to carry French goods (and get rid of the Dutch as a privileged 
19 Hübner, discussed above, whose aim was to recreate a natural harmony among states did not 
envisage an overhaul of the Balance of Power. Yet, the combination of this element in his position 
and the fact that an extremely aggressive anti-British treatise written by Maubert de Gouvest was 
published in his name in 1756 in Copenhagen created problems for his reputation during his stay as 
a government official in London.
20 “Passive neutrality” was also associated with the idea of unchanged behaviour vis-à-vis states 
at war on both parties.
21 Robert Plumer Ward, A treatise of the relative rights and duties of belligerent and neutral powers 
in maritime affairs: in which the principles of armed neutralities, and the opinions of Hubner and 
Schlegel are fully discussed (London, 1801), Georg Friedrich Martens, Précis du droit des gens 
modernes de l’Europe (Göttingen, 1821 [3rd ed.]). See Isaac Nakhimovsky, “Carl Schmitt’s Vattel 
and the Law of Nations: between Enlightenment and Revolution”, Grotiana 31 (2010), pp. 141–64 
and his “Vattel’s theory of the international order: Commerce and the balance of power in the Law 
of Nations”, History of European Ideas 33, pp. 157–73 for the relation between Wolff’s idea of the 
civitas maxima, Vattel’s idea that treaties and the existing Balance of Power could be taken as a 
code or approximation of Wolff’s idea, and Ward’s positive appraisal of Vattel.
22 Adriaan Kluit corresponded with Martens on these matters and Hogendorp took Ward as his 
guide to understanding the problems of neutrality as well as the logic behind the 1786 Eden Treaty. 
See Paul Chr. H. Overmeer, De economische denkbeelden van Gijsbert Karel van Hogendorp 
(1762–1834) (Tilburg, 1982), pp. 151–2. 
23 Isaac de Pinto and a few other pamphleteers (a minority in the Dutch debate) argued this. See 
my article on Dutch neutrality. 
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carrier) led to the conclusion of commercial treaties with Denmark and Sweden in 
the 1740s.24 Both in this last case and in the case of French-Dutch relations the 
importance of the ratification of commercial treaties in the development of small 
states’ attitudes towards neutral trade in wartime was great and has been if not 
mostly overlooked at least never been specifically studied.25
More detailed historical study of the national contexts in which different notions 
of “active” neutrality were discussed as part of rival outlooks on the foreign 
trade policy and international relations may lead to a more complete picture of 
the interrelation between theories of trade, treaty politics and shifting practices 
concerning neutral trade. At this stage the best works on the law of neutrality, in 
fact virtually the only works dedicated to the subject have been published in the 
field of the history of international law, where different categorisations have been 
put forward compared with the forms of neutrality just discussed.26 
Scholars of international law have also witnessed and participated in the 
processes by which the law of neutrality as a major part within classical international 
law demised in the wake of the First World War, when analysis of the British recourse 
to and management of its blockade policy led to the conclusion that the existing 
idea of neutrality was bankrupt.27 Neutrality, in the form in which it came down 
from history, itself was thus deemed a cause of escalating military conflict and 
24 See the articles by Antonella Alimento on Forbonnais and Leos Müller on Sweden. Ere 
Nokkala’s article in this volume discusses Justi’s reflections on the predicament of Prussia and 
minor German states in relation to the model of neutral politics provided by Denmark. On the specific 
development of the legislation of neutral trade rights from the French point of view see the article by 
Eric Schnakenbourg. On Nordic neutral trade, see H.S.K. Kent, War and Trade in Northern Seas: 
Anglo-Scandinavian economic relations in the mid eighteenth century (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1973).
25 Articles by Antonella Alimento and myself in the forthcoming publication from the research 
project “Guerra, commercio e neutralità nell’Europa d’Antico regime (1648–1789)”, directed by 
Antonella Alimento, will focus on the significance of commercial treaties in French and Dutch foreign 
trade policy. To understand these cases including the British case (notably the 1713 Tory Bill and the 
1786 Eden Treaty) is crucial, see Richard Whatmore “Shelburne and Perpetual Peace: Small States, 
Commerce and International Relations within the Bowood Circle”, An Enlightenment Statesman in 
Whig Britain: Lord Shelburne (1737–1805) in Context, eds. N. Aston and C. Campbell Orr (London: 
Boydell & Brewer), forthcoming in 2011.
26 Stephen Neff, The Rights and Duties of Neutrals: A General History (Manchester, Manchester 
University Press, 2000) distinguishes between three schools of thought. See esp. pp. 28–43. See 
the bibliography of this work – the most recent full overview – for references to the huge literature 
that exists on the history of the law of neutrality.
27 Among the flood of publications in World War I concerning the rights of neutrals some of the 
more interesting are James Bryce, Essays and addresses in war time (London, 1918) and James 
Brown Scott, The armed neutralities of 1780 and 1800: a collection of official documents preceded by 
the views of representative publicists (New York: Oxford University Press/ Carnegie Endowment for 
International Peace, 1918). An intriguing historical outlook on the representation of British blockade 
policy from the Napoleonic wars to World War I is in Best, “Britain and Blockade, 1780–1940”. 
Influential critiques of the principles of the old law of neutrality are Nicolas Politis, La neutralité et la 
paix (Paris: Hachette, 1935) and Quincy Wright, The future of neutrality (Worcester, Ma.: Carnegie 
Endowment for International Peace, 1928) and his “The Present Status of Neutrality”, American 
Journal of International Law 34 (1940), pp. 391–415. The downfall of neutrality was analysed (and 
judged differently) by Philip C. Jessup et al. Neutrality, its history, economics and law (4 vols., New 
York: Columbia University Press, 1935), F. Bottié, Essai sur la genèse et l’évolution de la notion de 
neutralité (Paris: Les Editions Internationales, 1937), Nils Orvik, The Decline of Neutrality, 1914–
1941 (Oslo: J. Grundt Tanum, 1953) and John W. Coogan, The end of Neutrality (Ithaca: Cornell 
University Press, 1981).
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subsequently faded from the legal horizons, which gave a rise to a redevelopment 
of the law of neutrality after 1920.28 Quite apart from the circumstances of the 
early twentieth century, it is remarkable (though perhaps not surprising) that this 
conclusion has led to a subsequent retrospective reduction of the importance of the 
history of the law of neutrality in the eighteenth and nineteenth century: if neutrality 
was seen by many or most as a dead-end by 1919, this was not yet the case during 
the eighteenth or nineteenth century.29
The purpose of this volume is definitely not to rehabilitate a classical idea of 
neutrality, nor to provide a full-blown history of the law of neutrality or aim at any 
complete historical overview. The history of neutrality from the perspective of 
political though remains still to be written.30 Instead, the aim of this collaborative 
volume is to help understand the late eighteenth- and early nineteenth- century 
debate on neutral trade in a more informative fashion and recapture some of its 
legal, political and philosophical dimensions. Its history as a debate has for a large 
part been forgotten, its significance and authentic character tend to be overlooked. 
Yet, its recovery, to which this issue contributes, is likely to shed new light on the 
fundamental processes and intellectual constructions that shaped modern states 
and the structural relations between politics and international markets that arguably 
exist until this day. It is hoped that the present publication can contribute to the 
growing body of revisionist legal and political studies of eighteenth- and nineteenth-
century state-building processes.
28 See for example Erik Castrén, The present law of war and neutrality (Helsinki: SKS, 1954) for 
the separation of legal neutrality from the political idea of non-belligerency after 1920. An influential 
publication in the construction of modern international law has been Cornelis van Vollenhoven, De 
drie treden van het volkenrecht (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1918 [English edn. 1919 The Three 
stages of International Law). Van Vollenhoven’s wider programme – beyond attacking the classical 
law of neutrality – was to restore the Dutch Republican glory of Grotius by making The Hague the 
centre of the new international law (see his De Eendracht van het Land (The Hague, Martinus 
Nijhoff, 1913)), a project that has a certain irony to it in the light of recent Grotius scholarship, and 
that also turned the table completely on the perspective of Pinto, Hogendorp and others.
29 From a critical or a liberal internationalist perspective early international law and the law of 
neutrality coming down from the eighteenth century indeed could never be properly “law”, and was 
seen as a form of economics, governed by interests and advantages rather than given in by the 
“international (moral) community”. See Martti Koskenniemi, “The advantage of Treaties: International 
Law in the Enlightenment”, Edinburgh Law Review 13 (2009), pp. 27–67 (p. 30). The international 
movement, including its reinvention of the Grotian tradition (on pp. 406–11) has been masterfully 
reconstructed by Martti Koskenniemi, The Gentle Civilizer of Nations. The Rise and Fall of International 
Law 1870–1960 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001). In opposition to the idea that 
classical neutrality had to be discarded see Elizabeth Chadwick, Traditional Neutrality Revisited. 
Law, Theory and Case Studies (Leiden: Brill, 2002).
30 Such a history would both include the countless number of late eighteenth- and early nineteenth-
century pamphlets concerning the Leagues of Armed Neutrality and the Continental System and 
British Blockade policy in the Napoleonic wars, and the not very well known mid nineteenth-century 
French, British and American politically interested accounts of the previous period from which 
conclusions are drawn about the relation between national state identity (in the form of “permanent 
neutrality”) and neutral rights and duties.
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Acknowledgements and prospective development 
This project has had a long and often interrupted gestation period from 2004 to the 
present and research on the topic is by no means finished. The results published 
here, I believe, reflect the current state-of-the-art of research on eighteenth-century 
neutrality politics within the (sub-)disciplines of international law, legal history, political 
thought and intellectual history, economic history, political science and (history of) 
international relations. The contributors to the volume are scholars working in these 
various disciplines and their articles might be read on one level as specialised and 
highly focused contributions to discipline-specific debates. On another level, the 
arguments developed and sources used by the contributors grab into each other 
creating connections between them.
The dual aim of this multidisciplinary approach, that was opted for at the beginning 
of the project, was to bring out the original political and intellectual dimensions of 
the subject of neutrality in the eighteenth and early nineteenth century, in order to 
better grasp its historical nature and to open up the subject for future development. 
It is for the reader to judge whether the combination of historical multi-disciplinarity 
and geographical variety (with studies focusing on a range of contexts, from Britain 
and France, to Italy, Sweden and the United Provinces, and ranging to Russia and 
newly independent America) has merely led to fragmentation, or somehow resulted 
in a sustained focus on the same recurring and intertwined issues.
This publication is based on a conference organised in August 2007 at the Helsinki 
Collegium for Advanced Studies31 in collaboration with the Erik Castrén Institute of 
International Law and Human Rights. Next to a number of fully revised conference 
presentations it contains some additionally commissioned articles. Organising 
this conference and the publication project would not have been possible without 
having been invited to the Helsinki Collegium for Advanced Studies as a visiting 
fellow in 2006, 2007 and 2008 by its then director Juha Sihvola, who expressed 
his strong interest in this topic. Juha’s unrelenting support to the project and advice 
throughout have been fantastic. Almost from the beginning Martti Koskenniemi 
added a dimension to the enterprise, both by agreeing to act as a co-organiser 
and generously offering the support of the Castrén Institute, and by lending his 
critical perspective on the history of international law as an input to the project. The 
remarkable disciplinary open-mindedness of the Castrén Institute and the Helsinki 
Collegium, with its wonderfully helpful staff, created the preconditions for holding 
this conference during three days in the most perfect setting any conference 
organiser could wish for. This was made possible also with the additional financial 
support of the Academy of Finland (Suomen Akatemia) and the Finnish Cultural 
Foundation (Suomen Kulttuurirahasto).
I would like to express my gratitude to the editors of COLLeGIUM for agreeing 
to publish this volume in their series. The Open Access format of the COLLeGIUM 
31 www.helsinki.fi/eci/Events/neutrality_programme.pdf
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e-series is expected to provide a platform for the further development of research 
on the subject of this volume: 1.) by making publicly available the current results of 
the project to colleagues in academia across a range of disciplines in the humanities 
and social sciences as well as to students in university courses in a range of (sub-)
disciplines, and thereby 2.) pave the way for the future development of the started 
enterprise, possibly into a more coherent narrative history on the subject.
Finally, but of great importance, I would like to thank, also on behalf of the 
contributors to this volume, the numerous anonymous referees and other helpful 
colleagues who have commented on the articles published here over the last years. 
Their careful reading and constructive criticisms have considerably improved the 
contributions.
